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Abstract This paper deals with the question of how consumption taxes, especially the value-
added tax, affect consumption prices. The analyses are based on data from EU countries for
the period 1970–2004. The starting point is a conventional supply-demand analysis of the tax
incidence problem. This problem is solved using some simple price mark-up equations, Phillips
curves and inﬂation forecast error equations. All these equations are estimated from panel data
from EU countries using different estimators and variable speciﬁcations. In addition, an analysis
is carried out with Finnish excise taxes using commodity/outlet level micro data for the early
2000s. A general result of all analyses is that more than one half of a tax increase shifts to con-
sumer prices. By contrast, there is less evidence on shifts to producer prices.
Keywords Value-added tax, tax incidence, consumption taxes
JEL classiﬁcation H22 ∗
1. Introduction
This study deals with the incidence of consumption taxes. More precisely, the intention
is to measure to what extent taxes shift to consumer prices. A motivating factor for
the analysis is an intention to lower the VAT rate on food in Finland. Currently, the
Finnish food VAT rate is one of the highest in the European Union (17% compared with
an average rate of 6%).1 The implicit consumption tax rate is the third highest in the
EU27 (27.3% compared with the average 19.9%, cf. Eurostat 2008). Partly because of
this a study group was formed to analyse the consequences of an eventual tax cut which
is to take place in 2009.2 Changing the tax structure is obviously a complicated matter
that involves analysis of the demand patterns, income distribution, market structure
and so on. In this analysis we disregard all welfare aspects and concentrate solely on
the issue of tax incidence. For practical reasons we cannot analyze the whole issue of
tax incidence but we have to concentrate on question of how do changes in the VAT
rate(s) shift to consumer prices.3
Intermsofempiricalanalysis, theusualwaytoproceedwouldobviouslybetoscru-
tinise previous tax changes. Unfortunately, very few cases exactly match the planned
∗ University of Turku, Department of Economics, and Public Choice Research Centre, 20014 Turku, Fin-
land. Phone: +358 2 333 5397, E-mail: matvir@utu.ﬁ.
1 Average 6% corresponds to the population weighted average of VAT rates for food and beverages. The
unweighted average is 8%. By comparison, the average US sales tax rate is 7.7%. For a more exhaustive
comparison of tax structures, see Eurostat (2008) and Coenen et al. (2008).
2 A ﬁnal report of group has already been published by Holm et al. (2007).
3 See e.g. Coenen et al. (2008) and Bye et al. (2003) for more analyses of tax reform effects.
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Finnish case, and only the recent tax cuts in Sweden, Norway and Iceland are gene-
rally directly applicable to our purposes. Evidence from the Swedish, Norwegian and
Icelandic exercises is displayed in Figures 1 to 3.






Change in food prices in Sweden in response to a 9 % tax cut







In Sweden, food taxes were lowered in 1996 from 21% to 12% (9%), which ought
to have led to a 7.4% fall in consumption prices if taxes had completely shifted to
prices. The corresponding immediate change in food prices was -6.6%, which came
quite close to this ﬁgure.








Change in food prices in Norway in response to a 12 % tax cut








In Norway, the corresponding ﬁgures for the 2001 reduction were 24% and 12%,
with an implied price level of -9.7%. The comparable one-month change in prices
turned out to be 8.9%, which again is practically identical to the implied value.
Recent tax reform in Iceland (2001) included to a lowering of the VAT from 14%
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Change in food prices in Iceland in reponse to a 7 % cut in taxes








(in some cases 24.5%) to 7%, which ought to have lowered the consumption prices of
food by (more than) 6.1%. New data from Statistics Iceland reveals that the immediate
price effect is as high as -7.4%. This, in turn, can be explained by the fact along with
the VAT tax cut, excise duties on imported and domestic food, excluding sugar and
sweets, were also abolished.
If instead the producer prices are scrutinized (using data from Statistics Sweden,
Statistics Norway and Statistics Iceland) one arrives at a striking result: the monthly
change rates are either zero or negative. Thus, these data does not support the hy-
pothesis that taxes would have shifted immediately to (wholesale merchandisers’ and
retailers’) costs.
Summing up, evidence from these three Nordic countries suggests that consump-
tion taxes almost entirely shift to prices (a general ﬁgure would be something like
90%). It is often argued (e.g. Peltzman 2000) that the price shift effect is not linear
(tax cut effects differ from tax hike effects, or the effects depend on the cyclical si-
tuation or the industry). Some support for this proposition is provided by Carbonnier
(2005). Results from the three Nordic countries do not, of course, tell anything about
nonlinearity, but they suggest that the tax cut effects do not completely disappear, as is
sometimes argued in the media.
In the case of the Nordic countries, such a result would in fact very surprising.
All these countries have small open economies where competition is severe, partly
because foreign competitors have relatively easy access to them. Thus, we basically
have a standard textbook example of commodity markets where supply is inﬁnitely
elastic and demand — by the nature necessities — is almost inelastic (e.g. Swinton
and Thomas 2001; Jha 1998). Under such circumstances one might expect that the
short-run price effect of the tax is indeed very large.4
4 Because the price elasticity of demand for food is very low, food appears to be a product that should,
according to the Ramsey principle, be taxed more heavily than, for instance, services. This in turn may
explain why there has been reluctance in lowering the tax rate, even though distributional reasons might
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Unfortunately, these three cases are the only that we are aware of and they do not
allow sophisticated econometric analysis. For this purpose we have to use other data
sources. In fact, we use two alternative data sets: data on the main VAT rates from
the EU15 countries and, secondly, data on Finnish excise taxes. The former data are
annual and cover the period from 1970–2004, for which the Finnish data are monthly
and cover a large number of individual commodities and selling outlets (the data are
derived from the CPI database) for the early 2000s.
Naturally, we can also make use of previous empirical analyses of tax incidence.
Useful summaries of the results are provided for instance by Fullerton and Metcalf
(2002), Besley and Rosen (1999) and Morin (2005). These analyses mainly deal with
speciﬁc commodity taxes. This largely reﬂects the nonexistence of the VAT in the
United States from where most studies come. As for the structure of the VAT (and
food, in particular), Morin (2005) is highly relevant. On the basis of these summaries
it seems fair to conclude that, as a rule, more than 50% of taxes are shifted to consumer
prices. Here, the analysis of Besley and Rosen (1999) dealing with the effect of sales
tax on prices in the United States should perhaps be particularly emphasized. They
observed that in several cases prices increase more than taxes. Thus, research results
are broadly consistent with the recent informal evidence from the Nordic countries.
Of course, there are differences between research results depending on factors such as
the: size of the market, length of the inspection interval, nature of commodities, market
structure, analytical framework, and sign of the tax change.
From the point of view of the current analysis these facts are somewhat alarming,
because the analysis of aggregate VAT rates in the EU does not exactly correspond
to an analysis of Finnish VAT rates for food. Neither does the analysis of Finnish
excise taxes exactly correspond to the policy proposal. Finnish petrol, electricity and
car markets surely have some special characteristics that have to be kept in mind when
interpreting the ﬁnal results. In particular, the level of competition differs considerably
(compare e.g. electricity and petrol pricing).
Nonetheless, these are the best data sets currently available and we work with them.
This study ﬁrst analyses VAT rates and then Finnish excise taxes. Before these analyses
webrieﬂypresenttheanalyticalframeworkandtheestimatingequations. Finally, some
concluding remarks are provided at the end of the paper.
2. Analytical framework
Let us focus on a single commodity c with demand and supply being equal to D and S.5
Moreover, let us assume that the corresponding curves are of the form: D = (P C/P)−d
have favoured it.
5 Note that in the subsequent analysis we do not always examine individual commodities but sometimes
aggregates, or even total consumption. In this case we have to keep in mind that instead of individual prices
wehaveimplicitpricedeﬂators. Moreover, taxesapplynotonlytoconsumptionbutalsotopartofinvestment
and public consumption, which aggravates the simultaneity problem. The implicit weights of the tax rate do
not exactly match the “weights” of the consumption price deﬂator.
Even though micro data are currently available on consumer prices (e.g. Aucremanne and Dhyne 2004),
they do not cover sufﬁciently long time periods for follow-up studies of VAR changes.
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and S =((1−t)P C/P)s, where d and s are price elasticities, P C the price of commodity
c and P the general price (or cost level), t is the ad valorem tax rate.6 Assuming now
that D = S, we can derive the following equation for the price “mark-up”:
logP C = logP−alog(1−t), (1)
where the coefﬁcient of the tax rate is simply the ratio of the price elasticities, that is:
a = s/(d +s).7 Basically, we can simply estimate (1) to obtain a, assuming that we
have data on P, t and possible control variables. Although the analysis is in principle
straightforward, there are several problems. The most obvious of these is related to
the nature of the price margins, logP C −logP. We have, in fact, several price margins
reﬂecting the fact that before consumption goods reach consumers they are handled
by primary producers, the industry and wholesale and retail merchandise companies.
Thus, we have the producer prices (PP) which reﬂect the prices of the industry and raw
material prices which reﬂect the prices of primary producers. The difference between
consumer prices and producer prices mainly reﬂects the costs of merchandise and retail
companies and their proﬁts, plus taxes, of course. In principle, changes in consumption
taxes could show up in all of these items (including consumer prices) but the effects
could even show up in the input prices of industry, including the raw material prices.
Irrespective of the way in which the prices margins are measured, it appears that
they not stationary. Thus, there is a trend-like change in almost all price margins
starting from the beginning of the 1970s and continuing until the end of the 1990s.
Since then the margins seem to have leveled off although Finland, Ireland and Spain
represent notable exceptions to this rule (see Viren 2007 for details).
One explanation for the recent behaviour is the introduction of the Euro and the
resulting change in the competitive environment.8
Here we can do little to control for the change in the market structure and/or com-
petitive environment. The only thing we can do is to include a time trend as a proxy
for the structural change or to move to ﬁrst log differences. Thus, we start with the
following simple estimated equation:
logPCit = a0+a1logPPit +(1−a1)logPMit +a2TAXit +a3t +uit, (2)
6 Here we do not consider tax incidence in the case of different market structures, although the case of
monopolistic competition, for instance, could provide useful insights into the different results of tax shifting.
Take, for instance, the case in which tax shifting exceeds 100%. It is hard to explain this kind of result by
anything other than a monopoly. (See the classic studies of Musgrave 1959, and Fullerton and Metcalf 2002
for details.)
7 If the tax rate applies to pre-tax prices the supply curve is of the form S = (P C/(1+t)P)s, and (1) is of
the form logP C = logP+alog(1+t). A convenient way of interpreting the result would be an analysis of
a monopoly-monopsony ﬁrm which has the following proﬁt expression: (1−t)p(q(x))q(x)−w(x)x where
t denotes the commodity tax, p denotes the selling price, q denotes the output, x the input and w the input
price (input could be e.g. an industrial product which is purchased by a retailer). Then the FOC gives the
following condition: p(1−t)(1+1/e)q0(x) = w(1+1/q) where e is the price elasticity of demand and q
the price elasticity of input supply. Clearly, the tax incidence depends on relative price elasticities e, q and
the curvature of the production/cost function, q0(x).
8 The long-run growth of the price margin may reﬂect similar tendencies in the functional distribution of
income. The results might, however, also reﬂect some measurement problems. If we compute the price mar-
gin in terms of import prices we have to acknowledge that import prices typically only include commodities
while consumer prices have a large weight for services.
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where PC = consumer prices (private consumption deﬂator), PP = producer prices,
or alternatively wholesale prices in the empirical application, PM = import prices,
TAX = log(1+t) where t = the main VAT rate, or alternatively the weighted-average
tax rate, WAR, that is used by the EU,9 t = time trend and u = the residual.
In equation (2), import prices can reasonably safely be considered exogenous (with
the “pricing to market” caveat) but with producer prices the assumption is not com-
pletely warranted. Producer prices which basically represent the prices that the in-
dustry obtains from its product could also adjust if wholesale or retail merchandise
companies have enough market power. With producer prices we can make an experi-
ment by estimating a two equation model where also producer prices are allowed to
adjust to changes in consumption taxes. The model which is basically an extension of
equation (2) will be reported along with other estimation results in Table A4.
Above, (2) has been estimated in a level form by introducing the lagged dependent
variable as an additional regressor and together with log differences. In practice, only
a0, a2 and a3 have been estimated freely, because a1 has been calibrated to be 2/3.10
Thus, we actually try to explain the gross price margin. Even so, we do also estimate
an even simpler price change equation that takes the following form:
DlogPCit = a0+a1DTAXit +uit
In the case of aggregate consumer prices, we could obviously make use of the Phillips
curve to verify whether, in the context of this curve, we could identify the effect of
a tax change, and whether the effect comes close to that from equation (2). Thus,
the subsequent analysis with the Phillips curve (and with unexpected inﬂation) can
be seen as some sort of robustness checks. Estimating a Phillips curve requires the
introduction of an output gap (or some other proxy for the real marginal costs) to
the equation estimating price level changes, which would otherwise in the currently
standard New-Keynesian hybrid form be of the following form:
DlogPCit = b1DlogPCit−1)+b2DlogPCe
it+j +b3DTAXt +b4GAPit +eit, (3)
where j = the time horizon of inﬂation expectations (forecasts), that is either 1, 1.5 or
2, DlogPCe = inﬂation forecast and GAP = output gap.11
When estimating this equation, we have used the OECD inﬂation forecasts for ex-
pected inﬂation. This makes estimation somewhat easier (we do not need to impose the
rational expectations’ orthogonality conditions), and thus instead of GMM we can use
least squares or maximum likelihood. In addition to (3), we also estimate a backward-
looking Phillips curve where we have import prices as an additional regressor to incor-
porate open-economy considerations.
Inﬂation forecasts can also be used in assessing how much unanticipated inﬂation
is a consequence of unanticipated changes in VAT rates. One cannot obviously say
9 WAR refers to the weighted average (tax) rate, which is computed as a ratio between VAR receipts and the
so-called VAT base. In a sense, it represents a weighted average of different VAT rates and VAT exceptions.
10 By calibrating the values we have partly circumvented simultaneity problems that are related to unre-
stricted estimation of (2). Estimation results were not overly sensitive for this calibration. Alternatively, we
use IV estimation (Table A4).
11 Output gaps are constructed by means of the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter with the usual weight parameter 100.
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how well VAT rate changes are known in advance in the OECD but, fortunately, we
have forecasts that go two years ahead of the forecasting period (e.g. forecasts that are
made in autumn 2002 for the year 2004).
Forecast errors for different time horizons give us the following testing equation:
DlogPCit −DlogPCe
it+j = c1DTAXit +c2GAPit +vit, (4)
where again the time horizon of forecasts is 0.5, 1 and 2 years.
The parameters of interest in the estimation of (2), (3) and (4) are a2, b3 and c1.
Although we might not expect that they are exactly the same, we might nevertheless
expect that they are of the same magnitude and at least between 0 and 1.
The analysis now turns to Finnish excise taxes. As pointed out earlier, this ana-
lysis is carried out using the micro level Consumer Price Index (CPI) data. Here, the
basic problem and thus also the analytical framework is the same as with aggregate
consumer prices. However, the frequency of the data is quite different (monthly) and
the commodities are genuinely different (commodity brand, weight and selling outlet).
The estimation period is (with a few minor exceptions) 2001M1-2004M12. Moreover,
the number of observations is very large, going up to thousands per commodity. The
problem is that we are completely unable to construct a proper price margin, let alone
price change expectations. However, because we have monthly data we may safely
assume that producer prices (costs) do not change at the same time as taxes. Later
on we see that this might not be exactly true, but otherwise we may proceed with this
assumption and thus estimate the following very simple price equation:
logPCikt = a0k +a1klogTAXkt +uikt (5)
Notice that now index i indicates a single commodity (commodity brand or selling
outlet; i.e. in the case of unleaded 95-octane petrol the cross-section of observations
corresponds to different petrol stations; with beer we have both different shops and
different brands/marks and bottle sizes) while k denotes the commodity group. In some
cases (electricity, petrol) we also include a proxy for the producer prices to control for
possible simultaneous cost changes.
The estimation period is so short that we may assume that other potential control
variables constant. For the same reason, no seasonals are included. In most cases,
the data include only one change in taxes which obviously diminishes the value of
information. In is not uncustomary that the number of events is this small. Take for
instance the case of changes in legislation (cf. e.g. MacKinlay 1997). Even so, we have
to consider the results as a whole rather than to focus on each individual coefﬁcient
estimate.
Althoughwehaveestimatedequations(1)–(4)forsinglecountries, hereallreported
analyses make use of cross-country panel data. For practical reasons, we restrict the
coefﬁcients of the explanatory variables to be the same so that we have a representative
number for the tax shift parameter.
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3. VAT rate changes in EU countries
The analyses have been carried out with annual panel data from 15 EU countries for
the period 1970–2004. In practice, the data include 393 data points when we use the
main VAT rate as the tax variable.12 We do also introduce the two reduced rates as
explanatory variables but only the ordinary reduced rate (typically for food) turns out
to have explanatory power. When instead we use the WAR data the number of data
points goes down to 176 (see Figure 4 for the tax data). Annual data are obviously
not ideal for our purposes because in principle the tax rate change can in principle take
place at any time of year and the time path of prices can differ quite a lot between
countries and years. It seems, however, that almost all tax changes have taken place
at the beginning of the year, which makes the results somewhat comparable across
countries.










1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
main VAT rate, % WAR, %
The results are summarised in Table 1, while detailed results are reported in the
Appendix (Tables A1–A4). In Table 1, we report only the coefﬁcient estimates of
the tax variable and with speciﬁcations (3) and (4), we just report the results with the
longest timehorizon forinﬂation expectations (tominimizethe possibilitythatadvance
announcement of tax changes would show up in inﬂation forecasts). Anyway, a full set
of results is reported in the appendixes.
In assessing and interpreting the results we have several problems. First we need
to consider whether the partial adjustment type of model is appropriate to capture the
long-term effects of tax changes. The nature of the data (i.e. annual frequency) already
makes the distinction between short- and long-run effects quite subtle. In the case
the Phillips curve and forecast errors model, we cannot in a similar way measure the
long-run effects. Only if we consider the forecasts to be exogenous (with respect to
12 The EU allows for two reduced rates: a reduced rate and a special reduced rate. The rates should in
principle exceed 5% but some countries have received permission to apply even lower (zero) rate.
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tax changes) we can technically compute the long-run values in the same way as in
the case of equation (2). Whether that can be done depends crucially on the economic
rationalization of the lagged term.
Interpretation of the Philips curve is rather complicated because in ”free” estima-
tion the sum of lag and lead inﬂation terms exceeds unity. However, the problem does
not appear to be particularly severe and similar problems have been encountered in
almost all empirical applications of Phillips curves.13
Table 1. Summary of results from EU data
Speciﬁcation Estimator Tax rate Tax rate coefﬁcient
Price margin equation (2) ˆ a2
Level form; short run GLS, FE VAT1 0.200
Level form: long run GLS, FE VAT1 0.753
Level form; short run GLS, FE VAT1&2 10.163∗
Level form; long run GLS, FE VAT1&2 10.898∗
Level form; short run GLS, FE VAT1 0.099
Level form; long run GLS, FE VAT1 0.414
Level form; short run GLS, FE VAT1&2 10.118∗
Level form; long run GLS, FE VAT1&2 10.494∗
Difference form GLS VAT1 0.942
Difference form GLS, FE VAT1 0.428
Difference form GLS VAT1 1.017
Difference form GLS, FE VAT1 0.579
Level form, no lags 0LS VAT1 0.442
Level form; no lags IV VAT1 0.817




Phillips curve equation (3) ˆ b3
unrestricted estimates OLS VAT1 0.443
unrestricted estimates GLS VAT1 0.360
unrestricted estimates SUR VAT1 0.449
b1+b2 = 1 OLS VAT1 0.537
b1+b2 = 1 GLS VAT1 0.401
b1+b2 = 1 SUR VAT1 0.409




Notes: See the Appendix for details. All level from equations include a time trend, while the ﬁrst difference
models include only a constant term (ﬁxed effects, FE) or nothing. With inﬂation expectations, the forecast
horizon for DlogPCe
it+j is in all cases S3 which means that the forecasts are made in December (year t) for
the year t +2.
∗ denotes the sum of the coefﬁcients of the main VAT rate and the reduced rate. In the IV estimation, the
dependent variable is logPC, not the price margin. The data represent the EU15 countries.
13 Compare e.g. to the results of Paloviita and Viren (2005) and Tillmann (2008).
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One might argue that the Phillips curve is not best way to identify tax effects,
because if tax changes are known in advance they obviously show in expected inﬂation.
Only if we use a sufﬁciently long time horizon for expected (forecasted) inﬂation could
we perhaps circumvent this problem. Results with an unanticipated inﬂation model
seem indeed to corroborate this projection. Thus, the longer is the time horizon in
making inﬂation forecasts, the higher is the tax rate coefﬁcient. In the case of a two-
year horizon, the coefﬁcient is of the magnitude of 0.75, which makes sense according
to other empirical analyses and also informal evidence from the Nordic countries.
The system estimation results (reported in Table A4) give some idea of the nature
of tax incidence in general. It seems that taxes have a very strong impact on consumer
prices (the long run effect is even slightly above one) while the effect on producer
prices is quite weak (and statistically) insigniﬁcant although it is of correct sign. Thus,
the casual observations which were mention in section 1 for the Nordic countries’ ex-
periences with a lower VAT for food seem to be consistent with more general empirical
evidence. In other words, the VAT seems to shift mainly to consumer prices, not pro-
ducer (and presumably not to raw material) prices.
The empirical results can perhaps be summarized by saying that in general the
coefﬁcients of the tax variable fall within the range of 0.4 to 0.8. The coefﬁcients are
practically always positive and equally regularly below 1. Moreover, one may safely
reject the hypothesis that the coefﬁcient is just zero. Thus, taxes shift to prices: if not
completely, more than half of the effect shows in prices.
Here, it should be kept in mind that the results are not directly applicable to any
speciﬁc tax rate change in any speciﬁc country. Changes in the main VAT rates ap-
ply to all kinds of goods with a wide variety of demand and supply elasticities. Thus,
for instance, they include services where demand elasticities might well be larger than
supply elasticities. This, in turn, would show in lower values of the tax-shifting para-
meter which should be kept in mind when considering policy proposals which intend
to improve employment, for instance.
Between-countrydifferencesshouldalsobeconsidered. Forsmallopeneconomies,
it is quite clear that the supply of goods is almost perfectly (price)elastic, while in large
countries this assumption is not equally warranted. Thus, the tax incidence parameters
would also differ accordingly, being probably larger in small countries.14 But again
we have a caveat: retail trade appears more concentrated in small countries, which
might also imply a lower level of competition (DG Competition 1999). It is not, how-
ever, clear whether concentration indexes (measured as market shares of companies)
are equivalent to indices of competition. This doubt arises when scrutinizing the deve-
lopment of concentration indices: they tend to generally steadily increase in the EU15,
but this does not seem to show in price margins or in other indicators of competition.
14 A relatively well-documented case is that of oil prices. The supply of oil is essentially perfectly elas-
tic with respect to small countries or market areas, while for the world supply elasticity is much lower.
Thus, it makes a considerable difference whether individual countries or all countries impose taxes on oil
consumption. See Chouinard and Perloff (2004) for US evidence.
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4. Finnish excise taxes
The structure of the Finnish commodity tax system is the following: The main tax is
the Value-Added-Tax with the general rate 22%. The reduced rate for food is 17%
and the special reduced rate for books, drugs and transportation is 8%. Subscriptions
for newspapers are tax except. In addition to the VAT, there are excise taxes for the
following commodity groups: tobacco, alcohol, electricity, gasoline and cars. The
corresponding tax rates are also relatively high. The exact rates cannot be quoted here
because most of these taxes are combined ad valorem and unit taxes (see Martikainen
and Viren 2006 for more details).
Table 2. Results with Finnish CPI data
TAX Brent/TH R2/SEE N Pre-tax rate rate Ad valorem
Alcohol 1.022 1.000 12 200 0.999
(1290) 0.000
Cars (new) 0.700 0.990 720 7500 0.873
(20.11) 0.040
Cars (used) 0.183 0.856 12 7500 0.224
(8.03) 0.003
Petrol 95E 0.662 0.460 1224 34 0.402
(10.23) 0.036
Petrol 95E 0.313 0.161 0.538 1224 34 0.190
(4.82) (13.77) 0.033
Petrol 98E 0.738 0.562 1224 36 0.459
(12.76) 0.035
Petrol 98E 0.344 0.154 0.540 1224 36 0.253
(5.17) (13.20) 0.033
Diesel 2.422 0.360 1200 32 1.988
(17.41) 0.060
Diesel 0.420 0.499 0.680 1200 32 0.345
(3.64) (33.16) 0.042
Beer 0.829 0.991 467 45 0.748
(48.12) 0.023
Long drink 0.685 0.696 874 90 0.824
(21.24) 0.048
Cider 0.691 0.856 1063 83 0.661
(42.16) 0.029
Electricity 1.799 0.940 12 5850 2.154
(12.56) 0.000
Electricity 0.894 0.615 0.915 12 5850 1.074
(4.18) (7.36) 0.003
Notes: The pre-tax price is expressed in cents, with cars in euros. Koskenkorva spirits is used as the bench-
mark product for alcohol. The average price of imported cars is slightly above 9000 euros. ”Brent” refers
to the Brent oil price and TH to the electricity producer price, which has been used in constructing the price
margin. N denotes the number of data points and numbers inside parentheses the White-corrected t-ratios.
The tax rate is expressed in the log(1+(tax/pre-tax price)) form. The corresponding ad valorem tax rate ef-
fects are presented in the last column of the table. Computing the tax rates has been somewhat cumbersome
because no time series of the tax rates are available and in legislation taxes are expressed in either Finnish
markkas or in Euros/cents (sometimes in percentage terms). See Martikainen and Viren (2006) for more
details of the computation of these tax rates.
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Figure 5. Effect of excise taxes on consumer prices  
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This analysis deals with the following CPI commodity groups: alcohol, cars (new
and used), petrol (95 and 98 octane), diesel, beer, long drink, cider and electricity.15
The empirical results for estimating equation (5) are presented in Table 2. Moreover,
the tax changes are illustrated in Figure 5. The prices changes of old and new cars are
illustrated in Figure 6.













2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
new cars used cars
On the basis of the ﬁgures and estimation results one may readily conclude that
(a) the magnitude by which taxes shift to prices varies considerably between pro-
ducts/branches and (b) the short-run tax parameter falls short of one, being roughly
of the magnitude of two thirds.
These results are not, of course, in any way surprising given the differences in
market structure and competition between branches. Moreover, we have to keep in
mind that with items such as electricity, long-term contracts hide the price effects for
several months. By contrast, in the case of alcohol, all retails sales take place in the
Finnish state monopoly, the Alko Company, which in practice means that taxes shift
almost exactly to prices.16
The change in car taxation in 2003 represents an interesting episode in the inci-
dence of consumption taxes. It appears that car taxes have only marginally shifted to
prices. This is especially true with used cars (see Figure 6). Closer scrutiny of car
prices reveals some interesting insights into car pricing. In the past, when Finnish
car taxes were extremely high (more than 100% of the pre-tax price), car producers
and import ﬁrms tried to keep the import prices as low as possible. Thus, the pre-tax
car prices were among the lowest in Europe and much lower than, for instance, in
Germany. Along with the lowering of car taxation, import prices started to increase
15 Here we have omitted tobacco which is a bit complicated because of different tax rates for different tax
products. Moreover, pricing is highly regulated which produces an almost trivial result (Viren 2007). Thus,
in monthly data, only the tax changes show up.
16 The state monopoly applies only to retail sales to consumers; pricing of hotel/restaurant alcohol is not
considered in this study.
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(cf. Viren 2007). In other words, earlier car producers, importers and sellers paid
part of the tax but lower taxes also allowed them to obtain a better price. Scrutiniz-
ing the proﬁtability of cars to importers/sellers suggests that, after all, proﬁts slightly
increased in 2003 despite marked decreases in retail prices.17 The government also
beneﬁted from the tax cut, as receipts from car taxes increased by 18% in 2003 (for
more details, see Martikainen and Viren 2006).
The Finnish car tax reform clearly illustrates the errors that are induced when using
tax receipts (in relation to some scale variable such as the GDP) as an indicator of the
severity of taxation. If taxes are simply too high, preventing sales, one may mislead-
ingly interpret low level of tax receipts an indication of the lightness of taxation, even
if the opposite is true.
Considering all taxes, we may we conclude that, in accordance with the results for
consumption prices in the EU, excise taxes shift to prices in a way that justiﬁes using
the range from 60% to 100% as the conﬁdence interval and 80% as a representative
estimate.
5. Concluding remarks
Most of consumption taxes seem to shift to consumer prices. This ﬁnding is corrobo-
rated by all analyses that we have made.18 Although our analyses all pointed in the
same direction and indicated that tax shifting is of the same magnitude as in most pre-
vious analyses, we must acknowledge several caveats that complicate more afﬁrmative
conclusions.
First of all, in the European data we cannot control such important elements as ex-
cise taxes, various tax deductions and exceptions. Neither do we have data for market
structures or competitiveness (such as Herﬁndahl indices). The frequency of the data
also prevents proper analysis of immediate, medium-term and long-term effects. Ne-
vertheless, we can argue that evidence from tax incidence is sufﬁciently compelling to
nullify arguments that taxes do not show up in consumer prices or that the tax shifting
effect is negligible. In considering estimates of the tax rate coefﬁcient from the point
of view of Finnish food prices, one has to keep in mind that Finland is a small open
country and in this respect deviates somewhat from, say, Germany and France. The
level of competition is otherwise difﬁcult to compare, but casual evidence does not
seem to suggest that the Finnish markets work less perfectly then elsewhere in Europe.
Whether this is enough to justify changes in certain speciﬁc (here food) tax rates is
unclear, because the decision ultimately depends on estimates of the welfare effects. To
some extent these effects have been evaluated, but even then more analysis and public
debate are still needed.
17 If taxes are set on import prices, producers can have a strong incentive to set up a sister company to import
cars. The sister company can then have higher proﬁt margins, which are nevertheless taxed at a lower rate
then imported cars. This pricing strategy explains at least part of the change in pre-tax car price differentials
over time. For the data, see European Commission (2005).
18 An unweighted average of all (long-run) estimates tabulated in this paper is 0.64. The corresponding
median is 0.60.
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Appendix
Table A1. Estimation results from the price margin equation (2)





Level, PP, FE 0.442 0.013 0.996 0.42
(2.18) (26.91) 0.050
Level, PP, FE 0.200 0.003 0.735 0.999 1.33
(1.38) (5.42) (20.82) 0.028
Level, PP, FE 0.163 0.075 0.003 0.735 0.999 1.34
(1.10) (1.44) (5.32) (20.62) 0.028
Level, WP, FE 0.099 0.003 0.761 0.996 1.38
(0.92) (5.29) (20.92) 0.025
Level, WP, FE 0.074 0.044 0.003 0.761 0.971 1.39
(0.67) (0.76) (5.14) (20.84) 0.025
Dif, FE 0.753 0.132 0.31
(2.79) 0.041
Dif, FE 0.110 0.871 0.816 1.66
(1.02) (35.49) 0.020
Dif, PP 0.942 1.22
(3.69) 0.032
Dif, PP, FE 0.428 0.056 1.46
(1.88) 0.030
Dif, WP 1.017 1.19
(4.84) 0.029
Dif, WP, FE 0.579 0.049 1.50
(3.26) 0.026
Notes: The price (m) marginal is derived as: m = logP C −0.67logPB −0.33logPM. TAX = log(1+tax).
Level refers to the level from the equation and Dif to the ﬁrst difference speciﬁcation. In equations 4 and 5
(see the corresponding lines), log differences of the consumer prices (not price margins) are ﬁrst used. All
estimates are cross-section GLS estimates. TAX1 denotes the main VAR rate and TAX2 the reduced rate.
PP denotes producer prices and WP wholesale prices that used as the right-hand-side variable.
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Table A2. Estimation of the Phillips curve (3)
Equation,
time horizon pe
+i p−1 DTAX GAP pm R2/SEE DW
OLS, S3 0.545 0.531 0.443 0.098 0.911 2.35
(5.36) (8.11) (2.77) (2.88) 0.899
GLS, S3 0.534 0.521 0.360 0.092 0.909 2.13
(12.17) (16.12) (3.66) (4.63) 0.933
SUR, S3 0.551 0.522 0.449 0.097 0.911 1.96
(36.21) (66.40) (18.93) (11.78) 0.942
OLS, S3 0.339 0.661 0.537 0.125 0.915 2.03
(15.09) (2.86) (3.91) 0.906
GLS, S3 0.412 0.588 0.401 0.120 0.909 2.07
(19.02) (3.43) (6.20) 0.886
SUR, S3 0.423 0.577 0.409 0.133 0.967 2.03
(16.74) (4.90) (8.15) 1.425
OLS, K2 0.596 0.431 0.252 0.103 0.912 2.21
(7.48) (6.79) (1.55) (3.43) 0.953
GLS, K2 0.613 0.411 0.304 0.102 0.911 0.95
(13.04) (11.69) (3.84) (4.55) 0.950
SUR, K2 0.582 0.435 0.258 0.117 0.911 2.17
(19.32) (19.80) (5.69) (8.23) 0.959
OLS, S2 0.760 0.312 0.198 0.050 0.932 2.17
(16.35) (8.13) (2.76) (1.56) 1.175
GLS, S2 0.730 0.326 0.202 0.33 0.931 2.14
(18.67) (10.85) (4.64) (1.38) 1.167
SUR, S2 0.715 0.342 0.189 0.056 0.932 2.15
(25.17) (16.20) (5.57) (3.16) 0.943
OLS 0.775 0.169 0.242 0.200 0.895 2.09
(38.70) (1.44) (7.39) (12.53) 1.471
GLS 0.791 0.086 0.223 0.165 0.892 2.13
(54.04) (1.50) (9.32) (12.89) 0.943
SUR 0.799 0.085 0.269 0.178 0.894 2.03
(62.94) (1.11) (9.44) (12.92) 1.456
Notes: OLS denotes the least squares estimator, GLS the cross-section generalized least squares estima-
tor and SUR the comparable, seemingly unrelated regression estimator. DTAX = Dlog(1+tax), p+i =
DlogPCe
t+i, p−1 = DlogPCt−i and pm = DlogPMt where PM denotes import prices. K2, S2 and S3 denote
OECD’s inﬂation forecasts. S2 denotes the December forecast for the next year and S3 the corresponding
forecast for the following year. Analogously, K2 denotes the June forecast for the next year.
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Table A3. Estimation results from the forecast error model (4)
Estimator, time horizon DTAX GAP R2/SEE DW
OLS, S3 0.746 0.239 0.157 1.32
(2.22) (4.59) 1.321
GLS, S3 0.433 0.224 0.146 1.41
(2.14) (7.72) 1.304
SUR, S3 0.721 0.215 0.156 1.92
(17.17) (12.89) 0.936
OLS, K2 0.413 0.153 0.086 1.57
(2.56) (3.94) 1.264
GLS. K2 0.441 0.143 0.086 1.77
(3.37) (4.84) 1.263
SUR K2 0.408 0.122 0.083 1.80
(6.31) (7.30) 0.955
OLS, S2 0.082 0.209 0.039 1.51
(0.51) (4.52) 1.768
GLS, S2 44 0.169 0.036 1.55
(0.38) (5.13) 1.554
SUR, S2 -.001 0.150 0.031 1.87
(0.01) (6.38) 0.952
OLS, S3, WAR 0.628 0.234 0.157 1.59
(1.23) (6.05) 1.175
GLS, S3, WAR 0.442 0.205 0.152 1.39
(1.93) (8.17) 1.168
OLS, K2, WAR 0.373 0.164 0.171 1.52
(1.09) (5.54) 0.816
GLS, K2, WAR 0.389 0.151 0.170 1.65
(2.02) (6.52) 0.815
OLS, S2, WAR 0.317 0.087 0.069 1.56
(1.23) (3.28) 0.761
GLS, S2, WAR 0.259 0.065 0.065 1.69
(1.47) (2.93) 0.758
Notes: DTAX = Dlog(1+tax) where both the main VAT rate (VAT1) and the weighted average rate (WAR)
are used.
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Table A4. IV, GMM and system estimates
IV estimates of the level form equation
logPC = 1.014logPP+0.817log(1+tax)
(48.92) (4.12)
R2 = 0.991 SEE = 0.032 DW = 0.46
logPC = 0.082logPP+0.819logPC−1+0.125log(1+tax)
(2.92) 0(34.28) (1.66)
R2 = 0.998 SEE = 0.014 DW = 0.75
The set of instruments include GAP, logPP−1 and logWPiUS.
Arellano-Bond GMM estimates for the price margin (m) equation
logm = 0.601logm−1+0.286log(1+tax)+0.005t
0(98.98) 0(10.32) 00(35.01)
R2 = 0.885 SEE = 0.028 J(11) = 9.30
The set of instruments include, in addition to lagged variables, m−2, GAP,
logPMUS and logWP. Time series have been transformed by using ortho- gonal
deviations. J denotes the J test for overidentifying restrictions.
System estimates with the two-equation model
DlogPC = 0.004+0.135DlogPM+0.700DlogPC−1+0.037DlogPP−1+0.447Dlog(1+tax)
0(4.20) 0 (9.19) 1(24.98) 1 (1.71) (3.76)
R2 = 0.886 SEE = 0.011 DW = 1.67
DlogPP = 0.003+0.533DlogPM+0.158DlogPC−1+0.247DlogPP−1−0.031Dlog(1+tax)
0(1.51) 1 (18.78) 0(2.76) 1 (5.55) (0.13)
R2 = 0.723 SEE = 0.021 DW = 1.89
Estimates are SUR estimates with 552 observations.
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